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1. There is a large body of empirical literature on the performance of inflation 
targeting in industrial countries. More recently, work has been underway to extend 
this type of analysis to emerging market countries. 
2. See Batini, Laxton and Yates (2003) and Pianalto (2005).
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UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS CAN 
INFLATION TARGETING BE ADOPTED?





Inflation targeting has become an increasingly popular monetary 
policy strategy, with 21 countries (8 industrial and 13 emerging market 
economies) targeting inflation and others considering following in 
their footsteps. Numerous studies of inflation targeting in industrial 
countries have been conducted; much less analysis has been done on 
its effects in emerging markets.1
This article seeks to fill this void. It looks at the experience of the 
emerging market countries that have adopted inflation targeting since 
the late 1990s, focusing on both macroeconomic performance and the 
potential benefits and costs of inflation targeting adoption. It draws on 
a new and detailed survey of 31 central banks to support the analysis. 
Particular attention is paid to the implications for institutional change 
and to the feasibility and success of inflation targeting when specific 
conditions, such as central bank independence and lack of fiscal 
dominance, are initially absent.
1. WHAT IS INFLATION TARGETING AND WHY DOES IT 
MATTER?
It is now widely accepted that the primary role of monetary policy 
is to maintain price stability.2 Alan Greenspan, former Chairman 
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of the Federal Reserve, has offered an operating definition of 
price stability that is broadly accepted: “Price stability obtains 
when economic agents no longer take account of the prospective 
change in the general price level in their economic decisionmaking” 
(Greenspan, 2001). This is often thought to correspond to an annual 
rate of inflation in the low single digits.3 
Inflation targeting is one of the operational frameworks for 
monetary policy aimed at attaining price stability. In contrast to 
alternative strategies—notably money or exchange rate targeting, 
which seek to achieve low and stable inflation by targeting intermediate 
variables, such as the growth rate of money aggregates or the level 
of the exchange rate of an “anchor” currency—inflation targeting 
involves targeting inflation directly. The literature offers several 
different definitions of inflation targeting.4 In practice, however, 
inflation targeting has two main characteristics that distinguish it 
from other monetary policy strategies.
First, the central bank is mandated and commits to a unique 
numerical target in the form of a level or a range for annual inflation. 
A single target for inflation emphasizes the fact that price stabilization 
is the primary focus of the strategy; the numeric specification provides 
a guide to what the authorities intend as price stability. 
Second, the inflation forecast over some horizon is the de facto 
intermediate target of policy. For this reason inflation targeting is 
sometimes referred to as “inflation forecast targeting” (Svensson, 1997). 
Since inflation is partially predetermined in the short term because 
of existing price and wage contracts or indexation to past inflation, 
monetary policy can influence only expected future inflation. By 
altering monetary conditions in response to new information, central 
banks influence expected inflation and bring it in line over time with 
the inflation target, which eventually leads actual inflation to become 
better anchored to the target.
The monetary policy strategy followed by 21 countries has 
these characteristics; these countries are treated here as inflation 
targeters (table 1).5 Defining inflation targeting according to these 
two characteristics makes it clear why, for example, neither the 
3. See Bernanke and others (1999); Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001); Brook, 
Karagedikli, and Scrimgeour (2002); Batini (2004); and Burdekin and others (2000).
4. See, among others, Leiderman and Svensson (1995); Mishkin (1999); Bernanke 
and others (1999).
5. According to these criteria, Chile and Israel are not classified as having adopted 
inflation targeting until the de-emphasis of their exchange rate targets, in 1999 (in 
Chile) and 1997 (in Israel).
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Federal Reserve nor the European Central Bank is considered 
an inflation targeter: the Federal Reserve lacks a numerical 
specification for its price stability objective,6 and the European 
Central Bank has traditionally given a special status to a second 
numerical objective, a “reference value” for the growth of the euro-
area M3 broad money aggregate.7








 Israel 1997Q2 1–3
 Czech Rep. 1998Q1 3 (+/- 1)
 Korea, Rep. of 1998Q2 2.5–3.5
 Poland 1999Q1 2.5 (+/- 1)
 Brazil 1999Q2 4.5 (+/- 2.5)
 Chile 1999Q3 2–4
 Colombia 1999Q3 5 (+/- 0.5)
 South Africa 2000Q1 3–6
 Thailand 2000Q2 0–3.5
 Hungary 2001Q3 3.5 (+/- 1)
 Mexico 2002Q1 3 (+/-1)
 Peru 2002Q1 2.5 (+/- 1)
 Philippines 2002Q1 5–6
Industrial countries
 New Zealand 1990Q1 1–3
 Canada 1991Q1 1–3
 United Kingdom 1992Q4 2
 Australia 1993Q1 2–3
 Sweden 1993Q1 2 (+/- 1)
 Switzerland 2000Q1 <2
 Iceland 2001Q1 2.5
 Norway 2001Q1 2.5
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff calculations.
Note: All countries except Mexico publish forecasts of inflation.
6. See Kohn (2003a, and 2003b), Gramlich (2003), and Bernanke and Woodford 
(2005).
7. See European Central Bank (1999), Solans (2000), and Issing (2000). However, 
the European Central Bank has recently de-emphasized the weight attached to this 
reference value, moving toward a “pure” inflation targeting regime (see European 
Central Bank, 2003).
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Proponents of inflation targeting argue that it yields a number 
of benefits relative to other operating strategies (see, for example, 
Truman, 2003):
•  Inflation targeting can help build credibility and anchor inflation 
expectations more rapidly and durably. It makes it clear that low 
inflation is the primary goal of monetary policy and involves greater 
transparency to compensate for the greater operational freedom 
that it offers. Inflation targets are also intrinsically clearer and 
more easily observable and understandable than other targets, 
since they typically do not change over time and are controllable 
by monetary means.8 Inflation targeting can thus help economic 
agents better understand and evaluate the performance of the 
central bank, anchoring inflation expectations faster and more 
permanently than strategies in which the task of the central bank 
is less clearly defined and more difficult to monitor (IMF, 2005a).
•  Inflation targeting provides more flexibility. Since inflation cannot 
be controlled instantaneously, the target on inflation is typically 
interpreted as a medium-term objective. This implies that central 
banks pursue the inflation target over a certain horizon, by 
focusing on keeping inflation expectations at the target.9 Short-
term deviations of inflation from the target are acceptable and do 
not necessarily translate into losses in credibility.10 The scope for 
greater flexibility could reduce variability in the output gap.11 
8. Money targets, for example, have to be reset yearly and are hard to control, 
because shifts in money demand or in the money multiplier impair the control of 
the money supply and alter the long-run relationship between money and inflation. 
Central bank control over exchange rate targets is also limited, because the level of the 
exchange rate is ultimately determined by the international demand and supply of the 
domestic currency vis à vis that of the “anchor” currency. Shifts in sentiment about the 
domestic currency can thus trigger abrupt changes in its relative value that cannot be 
offset easily by central bank actions. Many central banks have abandoned money and 
exchange rate targets on these grounds (see IMF, 2005b).
9. The horizon over which inflation-targeting central banks attempt to stabilize 
inflation usually varies with the types of shocks that have taken inflation away from 
the target and with the speed of monetary transmission. See Batini and Nelson (2001) 
for a discussion of optimal horizons under inflation targeting.
10. Under “full credibility,” economic agents under inflation targeting pre-emptively 
adjust their plans in the face of incipient inflationary pressures, so that the central 
bank has to move interest rates even less and price stabilization comes at even lower 
output gap variability costs (see, for example, King, 2005).
11. For an explanation of why some inflation targeting alternatives may imply 
higher output costs, see IMF (2005a).
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•  Inflation targeting involves a lower economic cost in the face of 
monetary policy failures. The output costs of policy failure under 
some alternative monetary commitments, such as exchange rate 
pegs, can be very large, usually involving massive reserve losses, 
high inflation, financial and banking crises, and possibly debt 
defaults.12 In contrast, the output costs of failing to meet the 
inflation target are limited to inflation that is temporarily higher 
than targeted and growth that is temporarily slower, as interest 
rates are raised to bring inflation back to target.13 
Critics have argued that inflation targeting has disadvantages 
and imposes excessive constraints on central banks: 
•  Inflation targeting offers too little discretion and thus unnecessarily 
restrains growth. Since the success of inflation targeting relies 
on the establishment of a reputational equilibrium by the 
central bank interacting with agents in the domestic economy, 
inflation targeting can work effectively only if the central 
bank acts consistently and convincingly to attain the inflation 
target. In other words, for inflation targeting to work well, the 
central bank must demonstrate its commitment to low and 
stable inflation through tangible actions. In the initial phases 
of inflation targeting, demonstrating commitment may require 
an aggressive response to inflationary pressures, which could 
temporarily reduce output. More generally, inflation targeting 
constrains discretion inappropriately: it is too confining in terms 
of an ex ante commitment to a particular inflation number and a 
particular horizon over which to return inflation to target.14 By 
obliging the central bank to hit the target so restrictively, inflation 
targeting can unnecessarily restrain growth.15
•  Inflation targeting cannot anchor expectations, because it offers 
too much discretion. In contrast to those who worry that inflation 
targeting may be too restraining, some argue that inflation 
targeting cannot help build credibility in countries that lack it 
12. The experience of Argentina in 2001 is an example of this.
13. The experience of South Africa in late 2002 is one such case. 
14. The horizon over which inflation targeting central banks attempt to stabilize 
inflation at target is not always specified and varies from country to country. See Batini 
and Nelson (2001) for a discussion of optimal horizons under inflation targeting.
15. See, among others, Rivlin (2002) and Blanchard (2003).
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because it offers excessive discretion over how and when to bring 
inflation back to target and because targets can be changed.16 
•  Inflation targeting implies high exchange rate volatility. Because 
it elevates price stability to the status of the primary goal for 
the central bank, inflation targeting requires benign neglect 
of the exchange rate. If this is the case, it could have negative 
repercussions on exchange rate volatility and growth.
•  Inflation targeting cannot work in countries that do not meet a 
stringent set of preconditions, making the framework unsuitable 
for the majority of emerging market economies. Preconditions 
often considered essential include the technical capability of the 
central bank to implement inflation targeting, the absence of fiscal 
dominance, sound financial markets, and an efficient institutional 
set-up to support and motivate the commitment to low inflation. 
2. INFLATION TARGETING: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT
Empirical studies have focused primarily on the experience 
of industrial economies, because these countries, many of which 
adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s, have longer track 
records.17 These studies generally suggest that inflation targeting 
has been associated with performance improvements, although the 
evidence is typically insufficient to establish statistical significance 
of these improvements. No study, however, finds that performance 
has deteriorated under inflation targeting.
The lack of strong evidence from industrial countries may reflect 
several factors. First, there are only eight inflation targeters to 
look at and a limited set of nontargeters against which to compare 
them. Second, the macroeconomic performance of inflation targeters 
and nontargeters alike improved during the 1990s, for a variety 
of reasons, including better monetary policy (some aspects of the 
performance of many nontargeters along some dimensions was 
improved by preparations for entry into the European Monetary 
Union, for example). Finally, the fact that most industrial countries 
entered the 1990s with relatively low and stable inflation makes 
16. See, for example, Rich (2000); Genberg (2001); and Kumhof (2002).
17. See, for example, Ball and Sheridan (2003); Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2003); 
Truman (2003); and Hyvonen (2005), among others.
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it more difficult to discern any incremental improvement due to 
inflation targeting. 
In many ways, the experience of emerging markets offers a richer 
set of data for assessing the effects of inflation targeting than that 
of the industrial countries. The time span covered is short—three 
to seven years—but the sample of inflation targeters and suitable 
comparison countries is considerably larger. Moreover, because 
many emerging market targeters experienced relatively high levels 
of inflation and macroeconomic volatility before adopting inflation 
targeting, it should be easier to discern the effects of inflation 
targeting. In addition, looking at the experience of emerging 
markets can provide more useful information about how inflation 
targeting performs during periods of economic turbulence. While 
the global inflation and financial market environment has generally 
been benign in recent years, a number of emerging market inflation 
targeters were under substantial stress during the course of their 
inflation targeting regimes (examples include Brazil and other Latin 
American countries in the early 2000s, South Africa in late 2002, 
and Hungary and Poland since 2000.) 
For the analysis that follows, we look at 13 emerging market 
inflation targeters (shown in table 1).18 We compare them against the 
remaining 22 emerging market countries that are in the JP Morgan 
Emerging Markets Bond Index, plus 7 additional countries that are 
classified similarly.19
It is useful to begin by reviewing inflation performance of 
targeters and nontargeters over the past 15 years (figure 1). Inflation 
in both groups was high in the early to mid-1990s, but as of 1997 it 
was somewhat higher for the nontargeters, which, as a group had 
already begun to disinflate by 1995.20 Inflation fell in both targeting 
and nontargeting countries, but even into 2004 a sizable wedge of 
roughly 3.5 percentage points remained. Such a wedge reflects the 
success of most inflation targeters in keeping actual inflation on 
average close to target, although targets have been missed, especially 
18. All of these countries except the Czech Republic and Israel are included in the 
JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index. 
19. These are Botswana, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Jordan, and 
Tanzania. We also experimented with excluding these seven countries from the 
control group.
20. The hypothesis put forth by Ball and Sheridan (2003) that the countries that 
chose to adopt inflation targeting were those experiencing a transitory increase in 
inflation is broadly inconsistent with the data when the country sample is extended 
to include emerging markets.
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(percent)
Average Annual Inflation Rate
Volatility of Inflation Rateb 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff calculations. 
a. Regional average for emerging market and selected developing countries; average inflation rates above 40 
percent and volatilities above 20 percent are not shown, to enable clearer illustration of smaller average inflation 
differences in the recent past.
b. Rolling one-year standard deviation of inflation.
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for disinflating countries, which have tended to miss targets more 
often and by more than countries with stable inflation targets 
(table 2; Roger and Stone, 2005). 
To look at the experience in more detail, we compare the 
performance of inflation targeters before and after adopting inflation 
targeting relative with the performance of nontargeters. This approach 
raises the issue of what to use as the “break date” for nontargeters: 
while no partitioning of the sample is perfect, we follow Ball and 
Sheridan (2003) in using the average adoption date for inflation 
targeters (1999Q4) (dates range from 1997Q2 to 2002Q1). Other 
partitions of the sample yield similar results, as reported below.
As shown in the first panel of table 2, the level and volatility of 
inflation before inflation targeting was adopted are high and variable 
for many countries in the sample (figure 2). The convergence to low 
and stable inflation following adoption is striking: all countries 
are clustered in the 1–7 percent range, with a maximum standard 
deviation of 2 percent. The nontargeters also show improvement along 
both dimensions, and many succeeded in stabilizing inflation at low 
levels. As a group, however, their convergence is weaker than the 
inflation targeters, with many continuing to experience relatively high 
and volatile inflation. For real output growth and volatility, the pattern 
is less clear: abstracting from one or two outliers, output volatility is 
generally lower in the post-adoption period for both groups, with little 
change in average growth rates. 
Table 2. Actual Inflation Relative to Target in Selected 
Groups of Countries
Standard deviation 
from target (RMSE) 
(percentage points)a
Frequency of deviationsb 
(percent)
Item Total  Below Above
All countries 1.8 43.5 24.2 19.3
Industrial countries 1.3 34.8 22.5 12.3
Emerging market 
countries
2.3 52.2 25.9 26.2
Stable inflation targets 1.3 32.2 21.7 10.6
Disinflation targets 2.2 59.7 27.7 32.0
Source: Roger and Stone (2005).
a. Figures represent equally weighted averages of statistics for individual countries in relevant groups. Individual 
country statistics are based on monthly (quarterly for Australia and New Zealand) differences between 12-month 
inflation rates and centers of target ranges.
b. Inflation outcomes relative to edges of target ranges.
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2.1 Econometric Analysis
A more formal statistical analysis, along the lines proposed by Ball 
and Sheridan (2003), yields similar results. Underlying the analysis is 
the assumption that some gauge of macroeconomic performance—call 
it X—depends partly on a country’s own history and partly on some 
underlying mean value of the variable in question. In the case of 
the inflation rate for inflation targeters, this mean should, of course, 
correspond to the inflation target; for other countries, this would 
simply be the “normal” level of inflation to which observed inflation 
reverts. Mathematically, this process can be expressed as follows:
                                                                                                                 
Xi,t = φ [αT di,t + αN (1– di,t) ] + (1– φ) Xi,t–1,                                                      (1)
where Xi,t is the value of a macroeconomic performance indicator X 
for country i at time t, αT is the mean to which X reverts for inflation 
targeters, αN is the mean to which X reverts for nontargeters, and 
di,t is a variable equal to 1 for targeters and 0 for nontargeters. The 
parameter φ represents the speed with which X reverts to its group-
specific α: a value of φ equal to 1 means X reverts completely after one 
period, while a value of φ equal to 0 implies that X depends only on its 
history, with no tendency to revert to any particular value.
The regression used by Ball and Sheridan (2003), and in the results 
reported in tables 3–6, is a version of equation (1), rewritten in terms 
of the change in X, appending an error term e, and assuming there 
are two periods, pre and post adoption:
                                                                                                                 
Xi,post – Xi,pre = φαT di + φαN (1 – di) – φ Xi,pre + ei,                            (2)
or, letting a0 = φαN, a1 = φ(αT – αN) and b = –φ, 
                                                                                                                 
Xi,post – Xi,pre = a0 + a1 di + bXi,pre + ei.                                                                  (3)
The pre-period for inflation targeters is defined as 1985 until the 
quarter before the adoption of inflation targeting; the post-period runs 
from inflation targeting adoption through 2004. The break date for 
nontargeters is 1999Q4, which corresponds to the mean adoption date 
for emerging-market inflation targeters.
Table 3 reports the baseline results obtained from estimating 
equation (3) on the full sample of 35 emerging market economies of 
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the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index plus the Czech Republic 
and Israel (which are inflation targeters but not part of the index) plus 
7 countries that are often classified as emerging markets. Included 
in the set of X variables are CPI inflation, inflation volatility, the 
volatility of real GDP growth, and the output gap.
Table 3. Baseline Results
Variables IT dummy variable
CPI inflation –4.820**
Volatility of CPI inflation –3.638**
Volatility of real output growth –0.633
Volatility of output gap –0.010**
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: One, two, and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 
1 percent level, respectively.
In this framework the relevant parameter for gauging the 
economic impact of inflation targeting is a1, the coefficient on the 
inflation targeting dummy variable. This parameter is reported 
in tables 3–6 (ao captures whether there has been a generalized 
improvement in macroeconomic performance across countries 
independently of differences in monetary regimes). Consider the 
row on CPI inflation in table 3, showing estimates of equation (3) 
when X = CPI inflation. There a1 = -4.8, implying that in countries 
that have adopted inflation targeting, the reduction in CPI inflation 
was on average 4.8 percentage points greater than in countries that 
did not do so. Note that if φ were known to be zero (that is, complete 
mean reversion), the estimated a1 would be nothing more than the 
difference between average Xpost – Xpre for inflation targeters and 
nontargeters; the only advantage of the regression method is that 
it controls for the initial level of Xpre. Furthermore, by focusing on 
relatively long periods of time, the analysis is largely a comparison 
of steady states, saying nothing about what happens during the 
transition to an inflation targeting (or any other) policy framework; 
doing so would require a very careful control of cyclical conditions 
to distinguish transition effects from the normal trajectory of the 
business cycle.
The results in table 3 reaffirm the descriptive statistics and the 
visual impression from the plots: inflation targeting is associated with 
a significant 4.8 percentage point reduction in average inflation and a 
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Figure 2. Inflation and Growth Performancea
(1985–2004; percent; average on x-axis)
  Inflation Targeters:  Non-inflation Targeters:
  Annual Inflation Rate  Annual Inflation Rate
  Inflation Targeters:  Non-inflation Targeters:
  Annual Growth Rate  Annual Growth Rate
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; OECD Analytical Database; and IMF staff calculations.
a. Period average for emerging market and selected developing countries, with pre-inflation targeting average 
inflation less than 40 percent. 
b. Rolling one year standard deviation of inflation.
reduction in its standard deviation of 3.6 percentage points relative to 
other strategies.21 The standard deviation of output gap is also slightly 
lower for the inflation targeters, and the difference between targeters 
and nontargeters is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
21. This finding is at odds with arguments raised by Kumhof (2002), Genberg (2001), 
and Rich (2000), among others, that inflation targeting is too soft or too discretionary 
to enable central banks to reduce inflation on a durable basis.
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Thus there is no evidence that inflation targeters meet their inflation 
objectives at the expense of real output stabilization.22
The result that inflation targeting improves inflation performance 
more than other regimes is in a sense unsurprising, as the control 
of inflation is, after all, the central bank’s overriding medium-term 
objective. An interesting question is how performance compares on 
other dimensions that are not directly related to inflation per se, 
including survey-based inflation expectations; their volatility; and 
the volatility of the nominal exchange rate, foreign reserves, and 
real interest rates. Inflation targeting performance was checked with 
respect to a proxy for the probability of exchange rate crises, using the 
exchange market pressure index, based on the seminal work of Girton 
and Roper (1977) and developed by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 
(1994) and Eichengreen (1995).
Using the same statistical framework as before, we find that 
inflation targeting leads to a reduction in the level and volatility 
of inflation expectations, along with inflation itself (table 6). This 
confirms the notion that inflation targeting has an advantage over 
other regimes in anchoring expectations and building credibility on a 
more durable basis, even if inflation targets are missed more frequently 
in emerging markets than in industrial countries. In the sample used 
here, the fiscal position before adoption of inflation targeting or the 
absence of fiscal improvement following adoption does not seem to 
affect the ability of inflation targeting to deliver lower or more stable 
inflation (or inflation expectations) relative to other strategies.23 
Nominal exchange rate volatility is lower than in nontargeters, as is 
the standard deviation of the real interest rate and the volatility of 
international reserves.24 Interestingly, there is evidence at the 5 percent 
significance level that inflation targeting is associated with a lower 
probability of crises, perhaps in part reflecting the greater de jure, if 
not de facto, flexibility of the exchange rate regime.
22. This result suggests that concerns raised by, among others, Benjamin Friedman 
(2001); Baltensperger, Fischer, and Jordan (2002); Meyer (2002); Rivlin (2002); and 
Blanchard (2003) that inflation targeting is too rigid and constrains discretion 
inappropriately at the expense of the rate or variability of economic growth may be 
unwarranted, at least for emerging markets. 
23. An event study by Celasun, Gelos, and Prati (2004) over time samples predating 
the adoption of inflation targeting finds that fiscal improvements may have helped 
lower inflation expectations in some emerging market countries.
24. Exchange rate volatility in inflation targeting countries is lower than in 
nontargeters, even when countries with exchange rate targets are dropped from the 
nontargeting control group.
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Robustness Checks
Next, we examined how sensitive the results are to: (i) the way 
the sample was partitioned into “pre” and “post” periods; (ii) the 
exclusion of countries whose inflation was high in the “pre” period; 
(iii) the exclusion of low income countries or of both these and countries 
that are not “upper middle income” according to the World Bank 
classification by income; (iv) the exclusion of the seven non-IT countries 
not included in the JP Morgan EMBI; (v) the exclusion of countries 
that are severely indebted according to the World Bank classification of 
country indebtedness; (vi) the exclusion of countries with an exchange 
rate peg in the “post” period; and, finally, (vii) different degrees of 
fiscal discipline across countries.
The partitioning of the sample into pre and post periods is 
somewhat arbitrary, both in determining the starting date for 
the calculation of the pre-period averages and in the assigning of 
1999:Q4 as the hypothetical break date for the nontargeters. In an 
effort to assess any distortion created by the arbitrariness of the 
partitioning, we re-estimated equation (3) using two alternative 
sample partitioning schemes. The first is to start the pre period 
in 1990 rather than 1985, thus largely removing any effects of the 
Latin American debt crisis from the sample. The second is to change 
the break date for nontargeters from 1999:Q4 to the date of the 
most recent de facto change in monetary policy framework (based 
on IMF staff calculations and the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions). Under these schemes 
and the baseline partitioning, however, the pre and post samples 
vary across countries. To eliminate any possibility that simple 
time effects could account for the results, a third partitioning was 
tried, using a standardized 1994–96 pre period, and a standardized 
2002–04 post period.
Several additional checks were performed to ensure that the results 
are robust to sample selection and to the inclusion of other potentially 
important factors affecting macroeconomic outcomes. First, to guard 
against the possibility that a handful of extreme inflation observations 
might be exerting undue influence on the regression, a control was 
included for countries whose inflation rate exceeded 40 percent in the 
pre period; a threshold of 100 percent was also tried. Second, equation 
(3) was reestimated over a smaller sample that excluded countries 
defined as low-income by the World Bank, as well also over a sample that 
excluded the seven countries in the control group that were not listed 
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in the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index. Third, on the full 
sample a control was included for countries that are severely indebted 
externally, in line with the World Bank classification of countries’ 
external indebtness. Fourth, on the full sample a control for countries 
with an exchange rate peg during the post period was used. Finally, 
on the full sample controls were included for the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the pre period and on the change between post and pre periods 
to rule out the possibility that the observed gains in macroeconomic 
performance are ascribable not to the introduction of inflation targeting 
but rather to improvements in fiscal discipline. Results for these two 
sets of robustness checks are reported in tables 4–6.
The significance, sign, and magnitude of additional controls is 
reported after the slash next to each estimate of the a1 coefficient (when 
nothing is reported it means that the control was not significant). 
In the first column of the bottom panel of table 6, for example, the 
significance of a precondition on the debt/GDP ratio is examined. 
Results indicate that the control is significant only for the volatility 
of 6- to 10-year inflation expectations, suggesting that having a 
“bad” debt/GDP ratio before adopting inflation targeting reduced the 
volatility of inflation expectations usually associated with inflation 
targeting by 0.018 percentage points relative to nontargeting. 
None of these modifications significantly alters the baseline 
results. Inflation targeting continues to be associated with a 
statistically significant larger reduction in the level and standard 
deviation of inflation relative to other regimes and little or no effect on 
the volatility of output.25 The main results of the analysis, therefore, 
appear to be robust, even when the improvement in fiscal performance 
in the post-targeting period is accounted for. Interestingly, inflation 
targeting seems to outperform exchange rate pegs, even when only 
successful pegs are chosen in comparison.
The conclusions of this analysis are subject to two important 
caveats. First, although the success of inflation targeting in emerging 
markets to date is encouraging, the time elapsed since these countries 
adopted inflation targeting is short, making it hard to draw definite 
25. The advantages of inflation targeting relative to other strategies are robust 
independently of the controls used. However, countries with an initial level of inflation of 
more than 40 percent show smaller reductions in inflation and inflation volatility before 
and after adopting inflation targeting. When severely indebted countries are excluded, 
inflation targeting still implies statistically significant macroeconomic improvements 
relative to not targeting, although the reduction in inflation volatility and output gap 
volatility is no longer statistically significant.
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conclusions about its effects. Nevertheless, the observed similarities 
in the behavior of inflation expectations in emerging market and 
industrial country inflation targeters over a comparable time span 
bodes well for what may lie ahead for emerging market targeters 
(see IMF, 2005a).
Second, in the absence of a counterfactual, it is difficult to resolve 
definitively whether inflation targeting is causal in generating 
the observed benefits. In many cases the adoption of inflation 
targeting coincided with the passage of significant reforms of central 
banking laws in the early 1990s, which might be interpreted as the 
manifestation of a shift in preferences toward lower inflation. The 
fact that these banks still felt the need to install a new monetary 
framework, however, suggests that a change of heart is not enough 
without a framework that allows the central bank to follow through 
on its intention. 
3. DO PRECONDITIONS NEED TO BE MET BEFORE 
INFLATION TARGETING IS ADOPTED?
A common objection to inflation targeting is that it is costly 
in terms of institutional and technical requirements, making the 
framework unsuitable for some emerging market economies. The 
most detailed exposition of this point was made by Eichengreen 
et al. (1999), who argue that technical capabilities and central 
bank autonomy were severely lacking in most emerging market 
economies (including several that subsequently adopted inflation 
targeting).26 Such countries, the argument goes, would be better off 
sticking with a conventional policy framework, such as an exchange 
rate peg or money growth targeting. 
“Preconditions” fall into four broad categories:
•  Institutional independence. The central bank must have full legal 
autonomy and be free from fiscal and political pressure that create 
conflicts with the inflation objective.
26. Agénor (2002); Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000); IMF (2001); Carare, 
Schaechter, and Stone, (2002); and Khan (2003) also stress the relevance of 
preconditions. More neutral or benign views on the conceptual relevance of preconditions 
can be found in Truman (2003), Jonas and Mishkin (2005), Debelle (2001), and Amato 
and Gerlach (2002).
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•  A well-developed technical infrastructure. The central bank must 
have inflation forecasting and modeling capabilities and the data 
needed to implement them.
•  Economic structure. Prices must be fully deregulated, the economy 
should not be overly sensitive to commodity prices and exchange 
rates, and dollarization should be minimal.
•  A healthy financial system. In order to minimize potential conflicts 
with financial stabilization objectives and guarantee effective 
monetary policy transmission, the banking system should be 
sound and capital markets well developed.
To assess the role of preconditions for the adoption of inflation 
targeting, we administered a survey to 21 inflation-targeting 
central banks and 10 nontargeting central banks in emerging 
markets.27 The version of the survey given to inflation-targeting 
central banks focused on how policy was formulated, implemented, 
and communicated and how various aspects of central banking 
practice had changed before and during the adoption of targeting.28 
Survey responses were cross-checked with independent primary 
and secondary sources and in many cases augmented with “hard” 
economic data (see appendix). Overall, the evidence indicates that no 
inflation targeter had these preconditions in place before adopting 
inflation targeting, although—unsurprisingly—industrial economy 
targeters were generally in better shape than emerging market 
inflation targeters at least in some dimension (table 7). 
Institutional Independence 
Most of the central banks enjoyed at least de jure instrument 
independence at the time they adopted inflation targeting.29 However, 
27. These countries included Botswana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Russia, Tanzania, Turkey, and Uruguay.
28. The version for targeters was similar in all respects but focused on change 
before and after the current monetary regime.
29. Instrument independence, which allows the central bank full control over 
setting the policy instrument, is by far the more important criterion of central bank 
independence. Goal independence, or the ability of the central bank to set macroeconomic 
objectives unilaterally, is rare, even in industrial countries, where goals are typically 
determined by the elected government or through consultation between the central 
bank and the government (see Debelle and Fischer, 1994).
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survey responses—corroborated by consulting the relevant central bank 
laws—indicate that only one fifth30 of the emerging market targeters 
contemporaneously satisfied other key indicators31 of independence at 
adoption and thus can be characterized as having adopted inflation 
targeting under a very high degree of legal autonomy.32 Of course, it 
is possible that even legal provisions designed to shield the central 
bank from pressures to monetize might be overwhelmed by a dire 
fiscal imbalance. 
The data suggest that inflation targeters faced a wide variety of 
fiscal conditions at the time they adopted inflation targeting. Israel 
and the Philippines, for example, had high public debt/GDP ratios and 
large fiscal deficits, while Chile was in good fiscal shape. The emerging 
market inflation targeters did, however, tend to have somewhat higher 
public debt levels than the industrial country targeters.
Technical Infrastructure
Central bank survey responses indicate that the majority of 
industrial and emerging market targeters started with little or no 
forecasting capability and no forecasting model; when a small model 
was available, most central banks report that it was not suitable to 
make forecasts conditional on different assumptions for the monetary 
policy instrument.33 In addition, although industrial country targeters 
often had some sort of systematic forecast process in place, most 
emerging market targeters did not. Key data to generate forecasts 
and analyze spending and price patterns were missing or of low quality 
30. This overall picture is borne out by broader measures of central bank 
independence, notably by indices prepared by Arnone and others (2005), based in turn 
on the methods of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991).
31. These include freedom from any obligation for the central bank to purchase 
government debt, thus preventing monetization; a high degree of job security for the 
central bank governor (a fixed term and provisions that allow the governor to be fired 
only with cause); and the presence of an inflation-focused mandate in which price 
stability is the sole stated objective. 
32. Legal autonomy has sometimes been granted concurrently with—or, in one 
case, after—the adoption of inflation targeting. Many of the central banks in the sample 
achieved greater independence in the early 1990s (see Jácome, 2001 for a survey of 
developments in Latin America). Hungary and the Republic of Korea became fully 
independent just as inflation targeting was being adopted, suggesting a recognition of 
the close connection between the two phenomena. The Central Bank of Thailand, which 
adopted inflation targeting in 2000, continues to operate under a charter from 1942 that 
says almost nothing about monetary autonomy. A new central bank law is reportedly 
under consideration by the Thai parliament. 
33. Exceptions are Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom among industrial 
countries and Poland and South Africa among emerging markets.
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at the time inflation targeting was adopted, with emerging market 
targeters at a disadvantage relative to industrial country targeters.
Economic Structure
None of the targeters enjoyed ideal economic conditions at the 
time they adopted targeting. Countries were sensitive to changes in 
exchange rates and commodity prices when they adopted inflation 
targeting. Dollarization was not a problem for industrial country 
targeters; the evidence on dollarization from the survey and from 
data collected by Ramon-Ballester and Wezel (2005) indicate different 
degrees of dollarization across emerging market targeters, with Peru 
the most dollarized targeter.34 Last but not least, the survey indicates 
that the consumer price index in a number of targeting countries 
included at the time of adoption (and in most case still includes) a 
significant share of administered prices. 
Healthy Financial and Banking System
At adoption most targeters scored poorly in terms of the risk-
weighted capital adequacy ratio; measures of financial market depth 
(ratios of stock market capitalization to GDP, private bond issuance to 
GDP, and stock market turnover or the maximum maturity of actively 
traded government or corporate nominal bonds); and the extent of 
banks’ foreign currency open positions. 
Failure to Meet Preconditions
The fact that none of today’s inflation targeterseither individually 
or on averagemet preconditions suggests that failure to meet 
them is not by itself an impediment to the adoption and success of 
inflation targeting (figure 3). This finding is confirmed by econometric 
tests. Using the preconditions listed in table 3 as additional control 
variables in the regressions from the previous section, we find that 
no precondition enters significantly in the equations explaining the 
improvement in macroeconomic performance following the adoption 
of inflation targeting (table 8).35 
34. These data are broadly in line with those of Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 
(2003).
35. The only exception is represented by evidence of greater exchange rate 
volatility for countries with better developed financial systems before adopting 
inflation targeting.




Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: For each of the four categories of initial conditions, 0 = poor and 1 = ideal.
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Two other messages emerge from table 7. First, in terms of 
institutional, technical, and economic characteristics, the gap 
between inflation targeters (at the time of adoption) and potential 
emerging market inflation targeting adopters (today) is relatively 
small, suggesting that these factors should not stand in the way of 
the successful adoption of inflation targeting in these countries. It 
is impossible to be completely confident from this analysis that this 
will be true for other countries that may have much weaker initial 
conditions than those documented here. But the evidence based on the 
sample clearly rejects a common view that emerging markets are too 
fragile and lack the necessary prerequisites to successfully implement 
an inflation targeting regime.
Second, the evidence and survey responses indicate that the 
adoption of inflation targeting has been associated with rapid 
improvements in institutional and technical structures, including 
developments in data availability and forecasting. Thus even if 
meeting institutional and technical standards may not be critical 
before inflation targeting is adopted, a proactive approach to making 
improvements by the central bank and other parts of government 
after adopting targeting may be essential to ensure the conditions 
needed for success. 
4. CONCLUSIONS
Inflation targeting is a relatively new monetary policy framework 
for emerging market countries. While the short time period that has 
elapsed since the adoption of these frameworks means that any 
assessment must be preliminary, the evidence from the initial years 
of operation is encouraging, with targeting associated with lower 
inflation, lower inflation expectations, and lower inflation volatility. 
There have been no visible adverse effects of targeting on output, and 
performance along other dimensions—such as the volatility of interest 
rates, exchange rates, and international reserves—has been favorable. 
All this may explain the appeal of this strategy for emerging markets 
in which poor past inflation records have made it difficult to build 
credibility and minimizing the output costs of reducing inflation is 
imperative for social and political reasons. It also may explain why 
no country has yet abandoned inflation targeting.
The evidence suggests that it does not appear to be necessary for 
emerging market countries to meet a stringent set of institutional, 
technical, and economic preconditions before successfully adopting 
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inflation targeting. Instead, the feasibility and success of targeting 
appears to depend more on the authorities’ commitment and ability 
to plan and drive institutional change after introducing targeting. 
Consequently, policy advice to countries that are interested in adopting 
targeting could usefully focus on the institutional and technical goals 
central banks should strive for during and after adopting targeting in 
order to maximize its potential benefits.
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APPENDIX
Data from the Survey on Preconditions and Current 
Conditions
Variable Descriptions and Data Sources
Unless otherwise noted, all data run from 1985:Q1 through 
2004:Q4.
•  Inflation rate. Calculated as the annual growth rate of the 
consumer price index. Quarterly data were obtained from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics and data from the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
•  Output growth rate. Annual growth rate of real GDP in local 
currency.  Quarterly  data  were  obtained  from  the  IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook 
and from OECD data.
•  Output gap. Calculated as the residual from a regression of the 
logarithm of real GDP on a constant term, a linear trend, and a 
quadratic trend.
•  Nominal short-term interest rate. Three-month money market 
interest rate or deposit rate. Quarterly data were obtained from 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and World Economic 
Outlook and from OECD data.
•  Foreign exchange rate. Local currency per U.S. dollar. Quarterly 
data were obtained from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics.
•  International reserves minus gold. In U.S. dollars. Quarterly data 
were obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
•  Broad money. In local currency, broadest definition available. 
Quarterly data were obtained from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook.
•  Inflation expectations. Survey data were obtained from Consensus 
Economics, Inc. Availability varies by country.
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Indicators of Preconditions and Current Conditions
Central Bank Infrastructure
These three survey-based indicators are intended to measure 
central banks’ data resources, modeling, and forecasting capabilities. 
For the regression analysis, an index of central bank infrastructure 
was created as the simple average of these three measures.
•  Data availability. Survey questions 78 and 84 asked whether all 
essential macroeconomic data were available at the time inflation 
targeting was adopted. Answers were coded as 1 if all data were 
available, reliable, and of good quality and as 0 if any data were 
missing. A value of 0.25 was assigned if all data were available 
but most were either highly unreliable (because, for example, they 
were typically subject to large revisions or available only at low 
frequencies). A value of 0.75 was assigned if all data were available 
but all were not reliable or of good quality, 
•  Systematic forecast process. Survey questions 47–52 asked about 
the forecasting capabilities in place at the time of adoption. If a 
periodic, systematic forecast process was already in place, the 
variable was set at 1; if no such process was in place, the variable 
was set to 0. 
•  Models capable of conditional forecasts. Based on responses to survey 
questions 47–52, a variable was created and set to 1 if forecasting 
models capable of generating conditional forecasts were available; 
the variable was set to 0 if no such models were available. 
Health of the Financial System
Six indicators measure the degree of development and degree of 
soundness of the banking and financial system. Two are taken from 
the survey responses; four are based on nonsurvey data sources. For 
the regression analysis, an index of banking and financial conditions 
was created as the simple average of these six measures. In most cases 
the health of the United Kingdom’s financial system was taken as the 
benchmark in constructing the components of the index itself, on the 
grounds that the United Kingdom is widely considered to be financially 
developed and sound from a financial regulatory point of view.
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•  Percentage of banks’ risk-weighted assets. Using data compiled and 
reported in a previous IMF study,36 a variable was created and set 
to 1 for countries in which the banking system, in aggregate, had 
regulatory capital in excess of 10 percent of risk-weighted assets; 
the variable was set to 0 for countries not meeting this standard.
•  Stock market capitalization. Using data from the World Bank, 
the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP was calculated for 
each country in the sample and scaled to the ratio for the United 
Kingdom, so that a value of 1 indicates a degree of stock market 
capitalization comparable to that of the United Kingdom.37 
•  Depth of private bond market. Using the same World Bank data, the 
ratio of privately issued bonds outstanding to GDP was calculated 
for each country in the sample and scaled to the ratio for the United 
Kingdom, so that a value of 1 indicates a degree of private bond 
market depth comparable to that of the United Kingdom. 
•  Stock market turnover. Using the same World Bank data, the ratio 
of stock market turnover to GDP was calculated for each country 
in the sample and scaled to the ratio for the United Kingdom, so 
that a value of 1 indicates a transaction volume comparable to 
that of the United Kingdom.
•  Lack of currency mismatch. Survey question 106 asked central 
banks to characterize the degree of currency mismatch faced by 
domestically owned banks. From the responses to this question, 
a variable equal to 1 was created if the degree of mismatch was 
described as “none” or “low.” The variable was set equal to 0.5 if 
“some” or “moderate” mismatch was reported. It was set to 0 of 
the degree of reported mismatch was “high.”
•  Maturity of bonds. Survey question 114 asked central banks 
to report the maximum maturity of actively traded bonds. The 
response to this question was converted to years and divided by 30, 
so that countries with actively traded 30-year bonds were assigned 
a value of 1 for this variable. 
36. IMF (2005), table 22.
37. The underlying data were obtained from the World Bank Financial Structure 
and Economic Database (http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/
database.htm).
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Institutional Independence
Six indicators gauge the degree to which the central bank is able 
to pursue its monetary policy objectives free from conflict with other, 
competing objectives. Three are based on the responses to the survey 
administered to central banks (checked for consistency against other 
central bank sources), three are derived from independent data sources. 
For the regression analysis, an index of institutional autonomy was 
created as the simple average of these six measures.
•  Absence of fiscal obligation. Survey questions 3 and 7 asked central 
banks whether there was an implicit or explicit obligation to 
finance government budget deficits. From the responses, a variable 
was created and set equal 1 if no such obligation existed and 0 
otherwise.
•  Operational independence. Survey questions 4 and 7 asked whether 
the central bank had full “instrument independence,” giving it 
sole responsibility for setting the monetary policy instrument. 
A variable was created and set to 1 for countries reporting full 
instrument independence and 0 otherwise. 
•  Inflation-focused mandate. Survey questions 14 and 18 asked 
central banks to describe their legal mandate. From these 
responses, a variable was created and set to 1 if inflation is the 
only formal objective, to 0.5 if other objectives are specified but 
inflation takes precedence, and to 0 if other objectives are specified 
on an equal footing with inflation. 
•  Favorable fiscal balance. Using primary fiscal balance data from 
the IMF and the OECD, a variable was created indicating a lack of 
pressure to finance fiscal deficits. For each country in the sample, 
the ratio of the primary fiscal balance to GDP was calculated 
and averaged over the two years before the adoption of inflation 
targeting. (For nontargeters, the most recent two years were used.) 
This ratio was converted to a score ranging from 0 to 1 using a 
logistic transformation, scaled in such a way that a budget that 
was in balance or in surplus was assigned a value of 1 and a budget 
deficit in excess of 3 percent of GDP was assigned a value of 0.38
38. The transformation used is: exp(2 × (balance + 1.5))/[1 + exp(2 × (balance + 
1.5))], where “balance” is the fiscal balance, expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
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•  Low public debt. Using data from the OECD and the IMF’s Fiscal 
Affairs Department/World Economic Outlook public debt database, 
the ratio of public debt to GDP was calculated for the year before 
inflation targeting was adopted. (For nontargeters, the most recent 
observation was used.) From this, a variable was created equal to 
the greater of 1 or 1 minus the ratio of debt to GDP. Thus a country 
with no public debt received a value of 1 and one with a ratio of 
debt to GDP equal to or greater than 100 received a value of 0. 
•  Central bank independence. This variable is the “overall” 
measure (the average of political and economic) of central bank 
independence reported by Arnone and others (2005).39 These data 
are available for 1991–92 and 2003. They are scaled so that a value 
of 1 indicates complete independence while lower values indicate 
less independence.
Economic Structure
Five indicators capture a variety of economic conditions that are 
often thought to affect the likelihood of success of inflation targeting. 
For the regression analysis, an index of economic conditions was 
created as the simple average of these five measures.
•  Low exchange rate pass-through. Survey question 96 asked central 
banks to characterize the degree of exchange rate pass-through. 
The responses were coded as follows: 1 for “not sensitive,” 0.5 for 
“sensitive,” and 0 for “very sensitive.”
•  Low sensitivity to commodity prices. Survey question 97 asked 
central banks to characterize the degree of sensitivity of 
inflation to commodity price fluctuations. The responses were 
coded as follows: 1 for “not sensitive,” 0.5 for “sensitive,” and 0 
for “very sensitive.”
•  Extent of dollarization. Survey question 98 asked central banks to 
characterize the degree of dollarization in their economies.  These 
responses and data from Ramon-Ballester and Wezel (2005) were 
used to construct a variable whose value was set to 1 for countries with 
little or no dollarization, 0.5 for countries with some dollarization, 
and 0 for countries with a high degree of dollarization.
39. See Arnone and others  (2005). 
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•  Extent of trade openness. The ratio of exports plus imports to GDP 
was calculated using data from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics and World Economic Outlook and the OECD. This ratio 
was then scaled to that of Singapore (the economy with the largest 
trade share relative to GDP) and subtracted from 1, resulting in 
an index that equals 1 in the hypothetical case of a completely 
autarchic economy and 0 for an economy with a degree of trade 
openness comparable to that of Singapore. Inflation targeters’ 
preconditions were calculated using an average of the trade to GDP 
ratio over the two years before they adopted inflation targeting; 
for nontargeters the score was based on the 2004 data.
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